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This essay begins in one of Stuart Hall’s quietly compelling comments. A few weeks after the opening in 
London’s East End of Rivington Place – home of the Institute of International Visual Arts, of the Autograph 
Association of Black Photographers and of the Stuart Hall Library – Hall was in conversation with sociologist 
Les Back, reflecting on a special issue of Cultural Studies: Stuart Hall and ‘Race’. Published under the title ‘At 
Home and Not at Home’ in 2009, Back’s preface to the full transcript of this lengthy conversation refers to 
Hall’s ‘mode of practicing generosity’ (Back is quoting David Scott who also draws attention to Hall’s ‘ethics 
of responsiveness’).1 The phrasing is resonant, capturing something of the collaborative quality at the heart of 
Hall’s intellectual practice. ‘I always write a bit in relation to whatever I’m doing,’ he tells Back, towards the 
beginning of their discussion, ‘rather than any longer plan of work’; and, ‘I write a bit in relation to them, as I 
always do’ (his specific reference is to the artists working at IIVA and Autograph).2 
 
‘A bit in relation to’: as a way in to Hall’s oeuvre, this phrasing draws attention to his role as a thinker who 
works through relating to others – their lives, their experiences, their questions. Hall’s subjects may well be 
familiar: ‘race’, class, the diaspora, black British life, popular culture (all vital to the development of Cultural 
Studies in the university). But his idiom remains rare. That work of relating is formative, ‘enabling’ is Back’s 
word; it helps others to form – their minds, their thinking, their practice – via a thought that, by bearing them in 
mind, demonstrates its openness to them. It’s a work at once ordinary (a freighted word in Hall’s writing as 
well as in Cultural Studies) and extraordinary, and only too easy to overlook. Hall himself expresses his 
surprise at the significance of his oeuvre to artists working in visual fields very different from his own. ‘It’s not 
an area which I feel is mine in the way in which other areas were,’ he tells Back. ‘My work was not unrelated to 
it, but actually, more surprisingly, many people say now, including artists, how formative that work was in 
some ways for them. And I don’t quite understand it’.3 
 
Part of what is at stake here is the mysterious labour of helping others to live, think, and create: schematically, 
to sustain what political philosopher Hannah Arendt calls the ‘life of the mind’, its work in making us feel 
alive.4 As Back writes a few years later in his Academic Diary: Or Why Higher Education Still Matters: ‘He 
[Hall] had a gift that enabled us to understand our life anew. …. For him thinking was always a process of 
transformation and changing himself, making sense out of the senselessness of exploitation, imperialism and 
racism.’5 It’s a powerful description, one that casts thinking as a form of transformative giving – to the self and 
to others – with the capacity to generate a renewed experience of being alive. On this description, Hall becomes 
something like a transformational object in the sense put forward by psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas: an 
‘object’ that, in its way of relating to us, enables us to experience it as an environment with the potential to 
change, or re-fashion, the self.6 Such an object can take very different forms: it can be a person, a body of work, 
a process, an event, an aesthetic or an ideology. But a ‘good-enough’ transformational object supports us in the 
interminable endeavour of creating, and re-creating, our worlds. ‘If you followed his thought,’ as Back insists, 
‘you could not help but be transformed too.’7 
 
 This, surely, is one of the reasons that Stuart Hall is treasured. To watch John Akomfrah’s The Stuart Hall 
Project (2013), for example, is to witness a mind, and a body of work, being honoured and loved. It is also to 
take the measure of a certain panic when, towards the end of the film, we hear Hall reflecting on the 
contemporary moment as one that is profoundly strange to him, and in which he does not feel at home: ‘I feel 
the world is stranger to me than I’ve ever felt it before. I feel out of time for the first time in my life.’ This from 
a man who, in an earlier scene, describes himself as ‘the outsider from the time I was born’ (‘I was too black 
for my family’) and whose face reflects an inscrutable pain on recalling his arrival at Oxford in the 1950s: 
‘Someone like me could not really be part of it.’ It was, Hall clarifies, a ‘very profound shock’. But it is now 
that Hall feels, for the first time, a stranger in the world, and ‘out of time for the first time in my life.’ 
  
These may be the words of a man coming towards the end of his life (‘The hospital, absolutely,’ Hall had 
acknowledged to Back in 2009. ‘I do a lot of my thinking there.’8 But they are also the words of a public 
intellectual confronting what Hall describes elsewhere as ‘the long march of the Neoliberal Revolution’ in 
Britain, its experiments in austerity calculated in human lives: on the one hand, an exploitation of the crisis of 
global capitalism to impose an accelerated marketisation of the state, including the public services on which the 
majority of British citizens depend; on the other hand, a motivated distortion of collective commitments to 
solidarity – social attachment, social bonding, social security – as nothing more than a greedy plundering of 
national resources by a so-called ‘culture of dependency’: ‘hardworking families’, those ‘just about managing’, 
betrayed by socialism as well as by those ‘sitting on benefits’, is the mantra of British neoliberalism for 
politicians on both Left and Right.9 Paul Michael Garrett has described the rhetorical investment in that shift 
from ‘social security’ to ‘welfare dependency’ as one of the most pernicious in neoliberal discourse; pernicious 
and, increasingly, naturalised.10 As Hall, Doreen Massey and Michael Rustin argue in The Kilburn Manifesto in 
2013, every social settlement is founded on a ‘bundle of beliefs’: ‘ideas beyond question, assumptions so deep 
that the very fact that they are assumptions is only rarely brought to light.’11 In particular, the notorious rhetoric 
of ‘welfare benefits as a “lifestyle choice”’ (then Chancellor George Osborne’s stigmatising claim in September 
2010), of the ‘benefit culture’ (David Cameron in 2011) and of a ‘damaging culture of dependency and 
worklessness’ (Iain Duncan Smith in 2014) has helped to create an environment in which to be disabled or to 
become ill, to lose your job or your home, is to risk an experience of (sometimes fatal) precarity imposed on the 
poor and the unwell and, by extension, on all those not protected by wealth or power from the fantasias of ‘the 
market’, its ruthless reduction of what it means to live a human life. 
 
In the face of that reduction, Hall stalls – it’s a moment of deep hopelessness in Akomfrah’s film – before 
finding his way back to thought: ‘That means hard thought, hard graft, recognising what the world is like, 
recognising the way the terrain is set against you, and then remembering the openness of history, and seeing 
whether one can intervene.’ This is, I think, one of the demands of Hall’s legacy: a non-programmatic call to 
arms, distinguished by its attention to context – a reckoning with the world as it is – and by a responsiveness 
grounded in historical understanding of the potential for change. A form of hope, then, but one aware of its 
fragile provisionality as we see what, if anything, we can do to alter the world in which we find ourselves.  
 
It is in this spirit that I turn to Donald Winnicott and Daniel Blake. At first sight, they may appear to be unlikely 
interlocutors: a psychoanalyst and paediatrician renowned for his attention to the earliest ties between mothers 
and babies, and an icon of working-class protest against the destruction of the British social state: following the 
release of Ken Loach’s I, Daniel Blake in 2016, ♯WeAreAllDanielBlake became a rallying cry against the 
imposition of a basic precariousness on the major institutions of public life in Britain (housing, health, social 
security, education).12 But to bring Winnicott and Daniel Blake together is to create a space in which to explore 
further the tension traversing Hall’s writings: on the one hand, that commitment to the work of relating and 
thinking – to thinking as relating – as a means to transformative change; on the other hand, the stalling of that 
work in the face of the ongoing destruction of the caring function of the democratic state (‘I feel the world is 
stranger to me than I’ve ever felt it before. I feel out of time for the first time in my life.’). That that function is 
under attack is one of the starting points of this essay; that such an attack aims at the very possibility of 
imagining change is one of its provisional conclusions.  
 
I, Daniel Blake: ‘If my mum could see me’ 
 
    Economics are the method: the object is to change the heart and soul. 
     Margaret Thatcher, 1st May 198113 
 
Having seen I, Daniel Blake twice, I have both times been left a shivering wreck 
by this sequence, awash with tears, aghast with anger, overwhelmed by the sheer 
force of its all-but-silent scream. 
 Mark Kermode, 23 October 201614 
 
During our screening, we were told that assessments often ignored significant 
health conditions. One profoundly deaf woman was informed: 
In your application form for ESA you stated that following an illness when you 
were a child, you are now profoundly deaf. After your assessment I tried to 
contact you to discuss your assessment. I telephoned you several times, but you 
did not answer, therefore I left you a voicemail. You still did not respond. I have 
therefore found you fit for work.15 
 
The scene has become iconic. Sanctioned for arriving late to her appointment at the job centre, Katie is referred 
to a food bank for a supply of emergency food aid. With Daniel Blake and her two children, Daisy and Dylan, 
she joins the long queue of people waiting outside a church hall.16 Katie is pale, fatigued, apparently benumbed; 
she sits on a wall to endure the wait along with all those around her. It is one of the conditions of being poor: 
your time is worth nothing. You can wait. 
 
Inside the food bank, there is nothing but kindness from the strangers – primarily women – who run the 
reception desk, shepherding children towards juice and biscuits, and helping Katie to ‘shop’ from shelves 
stacked with basic foods – potatoes, carrots, baked beans, pasta – and a few other essentials: toilet rolls, soap, 
baby wipes. But no sanitary towels. ‘People don’t donate them,’ the volunteer tells Katie whose lowered, and 
hurried, voice connotes her discomfort at having to ask. ‘They should.’ We are in the presence of the kindness 
of strangers, then, but dependence on donations exposes the limits of the individual gift as a means to help 
those living in food – or fuel or period – poverty. Those limits may be reparable; one of the effects of this scene 
was a substantial increase in the number of sanitary products donated to food banks across Britain.17 But the 
point remains. What people have to spare may not be what other people need, and the conditions in which 
others are living may be unknown, or unimagined. How do you cook a potato if you can’t afford to run your gas 
or electricity? Or if you are homeless? Or have no access to a cooker or fridge?18 Kindness can be contingent, 
random, undependable. It may not be good enough. 
 
We have already seen Katie trying to cook and clean in a house with no heating, lighting or hot water. Until 
Daniel gives her £20, she has no money to feed (the colloquialism is telling) the gas and electricity meters. Now 
we are about to witness the effects of her having restricted what she eats so that she can feed her children. 
Handing Katie a couple of tins of baked beans, the food bank volunteer walks off to continue picking out items 
for the family’s food ration. As she moves out of sight, the camera closes in on Katie who has turned away, as 
if huddling into the wall. She opens one of the cans, empties some of the beans and sauce into her hand, and 
then cups them into her mouth.  
 
It’s a desperate and complex moment. Katie is too hungry to wait to eat, but neither can she swallow the food in 
her mouth. As people around her become aware of what is happening, the need to eat gives way to tears and 
humiliation. Katie spits the beans back into her hand, as if ridding herself both of what she has tried to take in 
and of the sense of shame that comes with being helpless in the face of her needs: ‘I feel like I’m going under’; 
‘If my mum could see me.’ This is shame in the form of an unbearable visibility, with Katie hiding her face 
behind her hands, as if desperate for her ‘going under’ to be un-seen: ‘I’m sorry’; ‘I’m so sorry’; ‘I just felt 
really hungry.’   
 
That the very real possibility of going under is felt as her fault is one of the chronic aspects of Katie’s lived 
experience of the benefits system. In its current form, the welfare state has reduced her and her children to 
penury: a 40% cut in benefits is the sanction for arriving late for her appointment at the job centre after getting 
lost in the unfamiliar city of Newcastle. It has cut their ties to family and friends: after spending two years in 
temporary accommodation in London, Katie, Daisy and Dylan have been relocated to Newcastle by their local 
housing authority – a move that, in forcing a young mother to choose between decent housing (a bathroom, a 
kitchen, a garden) or living indefinitely in one room with two children, recalls the policies supporting the post-
war slum clearances in London and other major cities across Britain.19 In short, the welfare state has put the 
struggle to survive – the need for food, shelter, warmth – at the very centre of the family’s lives: conditionality 
and precariousness are built into this environmental provision, if it can be called that. But it is also undermining 
the very possibility of relation and contact – back in London, Katie’s mother precisely cannot ‘see’ what is 
going on – as if there is no room in the contemporary welfare imagination for the significance of attachments to 
people and places. 
 
Katie and her children belong to a state in which people without money for food are now imagined as part of a 
national community in which ‘we are all trying to live within our means’, even if that means going hungry.20 
Part of the wager of this scene – and, by extension, of I, Daniel Blake – is to trace and counter what Loach 
describes as the ‘conscious cruelty’ of the ongoing reformation of the welfare regime.21 Challenging Prime 
Minister Theresa May to watch the film, Jeremy Corbyn condemned that regime for its ‘institutionalised 
barbarity’: ‘While she’s doing so [i.e. watching the film],’ Corbyn continued, ‘perhaps she could take the Work 
and Pensions Secretary [then Iain Duncan Smith] with her because he described the film as “monstrously 
unfair” and then went on to admit he’d never seen it.’22 In common with, amongst others, Robert Walker’s The 
Shame of Poverty (2014), Lisa McKenzie’s Getting By (2015), Ruth Patrick’s For whose benefit? (2016) and 
Darren McGarvey’s Poverty Safari (2017), I, Daniel Blake reckons with a type of hatred at work in modern 
welfare policy and practice, its capacity to damage, even destroy, minds and bodies. ‘It’s like, when you’re on 
benefits,’ explains one respondent to Ruth Patrick’s research into so-called ‘welfare dependency’, ‘… [y]ou 
haven’t got your own mind’; ‘[On benefits] you’re just existing, not living,’ is how another interviewee sums 
up his situation; ‘You can’t really have a lifestyle on benefits … Me, being on benefits, I don’t really have a 
life.’23 It’s a common theme in studies that give space to the voices of those for whom poverty have become a 
way of not living. ‘It’s killing me being unemployed; it’s killing me, so it is. I’m dying to get a job’; ‘I think my 
life’s more or less … not finished [but] I’ve got nothing else to do, nothing else to look forward to, really’; ‘No, 
I don’t really think of the future. … I just get up each day, really’; ‘It’s soul destroying, it’s just killed me’; or, 
finally, in the words of a sixteen-year-old girl, reflecting on her chances of finding a job: ‘I don’t expect it, I 
hope it.’24  
 
 
‘You may cure your patient and not know what it is that makes him or her go on living.’25 
 
We, the UK’s leading bodies representing psychologists, psychotherapists, 
psychoanalysts, and counsellors, call on the Government to immediately suspend 
the benefits sanctions system. It fails to get people back to work and damages 
their mental health. Findings from the National Audit Office (NAO) show limited 
evidence that the sanctions system actually works, or is cost effective. But, even 
more worrying, we see evidence from NHS Health Scotland, the Centre for 
Welfare Conditionality hosted by the University of York, and others, which links 
sanctions to destitution, disempowerment, and increased rates of mental health 
problems. This is also emphasised in the recent Public Accounts Committee 
report, which states that the unexplained variations in the use of benefits 
sanctions are unacceptable and must be addressed. 
Professor Peter Kinderman, President, British Psychological Society 
(BPS), Martin Pollecoff, Chair, UK Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP), 
Dr Andrew Reeves, Chair, British Association for Counselling and 
Psychotherapy (BACP), Helen Morgan, Chair, British Psychoanalytic 
Council (BPC), Steve Flatt, Trustee, British Association of Behavioural 
and Cognitive Psychotherapies (BABCP)26 
 
No mind, no life, no future. This is the everyday misery of ‘getting by’, or not; the misery at the heart of I, 
Daniel Blake in its exposure of the relentless ‘politicisation of dependency’ (to borrow Lynn Froggett’s 
formulation) supporting ongoing reforms of the British welfare state.27 What Hall describes as the ‘ferocious 
onslaught’ on the social-democratic settlement since the late 1970s – an onslaught that cuts across established 
distinctions among Conservative, Liberal and Labour forms of political rationality – continues to undermine, 
often to devastate, the lives of millions of people across Britain.28 Its material costs are calculable, at least in 
principle.29 But as Andrew Cooper and Julian Lousada point out in their psychoanalytic study of the changing 
nature of the welfare project in Britain, the post-war welfare state was also a ‘socially sanctioned settlement for 
the management of our knowledge of social suffering and conflict’; in other words, it was a settlement, at once 
material and symbolic, that made human need and human vulnerability a properly social concern (from ‘cradle 
to grave’ in the classic formulation: you can’t birth or bury yourself).30  
 
What happens to our knowledge of suffering, our capacity to manage the experiences of need and helplessness, 
when that settlement breaks down? In the context of this question, the idea of human dependence is crucial. At 
once denounced and imposed by our variously hostile environments, dependence can be used as a type of 
switch word between a neoliberal ideology on the attack against the very idea of social security, and 
Winnicott’s psychoanalysis in its quest to grasp what, in ‘The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship’, he 
calls ‘the real meaning of the word dependence.’31 Belonging to the ‘third phase’ of Winnicott’s thinking, and 
first published in International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1960, ‘The Theory of the Parent-Infant 
Relationship’ can be described as another non-programmatic call to arms.32 In particular, it generated 
discussion at the 22nd International Psychoanalytical Association Congress in Edinburgh in July 1961, with 
contributions from, amongst others, Anna Freud, Daniel Lagache, Michael Balint, Masud Khan, Dorothy 
Burlingham and Phyllis Greenacre, as well as two further brief commentaries on the essay by Winnicott 
himself.33 At issue are the consequences of that ‘real meaning’ of dependence for psychoanalysis as both a 
theory of human being and a therapeutic practice aiming to bring about change in its patients. That the potential 
for change is on his mind is made explicit by Winnicott towards the beginning of the essay when he writes: 
‘The interpretations that are alterative are those that can be made in terms of projection.’34 Following this very 
condensed description of psychoanalytic practice – schematically, the work of grasping, and re-rendering, a 
patient’s material (words, silence, acting-out) as externalising representations of internal psychic processes – 
Winnicott begins to re-describe the basic facts of human infancy for their challenge to the foundations of this 
classic version of psychoanalysis. ‘[G]ood and bad things happen to the infant,’ he argues, ‘that are quite 
outside the infant’s range’; that is, ‘things happen’ but they are not describable (or interpretable) in terms of 
what the baby wants or wants to do – a drive to instinctual satisfaction, say, or frustration at the loss of an 
object: precisely, the vicissitudes of internal psychic processes – because the baby is not yet ‘there’ as an 
individual to experience them; or, in Winnicott’s best-known aphorism: ‘There is no such thing as a baby!’35  
 
It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of this claim to Winnicott’s provocation to psychoanalysis 
in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as to the ethos that made his work important to the post-war development of the 
welfare state.36 Across its diverse traditions, psychoanalysis does uncover the conditions for Winnicott’s 
‘dependence as a living fact’: a baby, born into an adult world, depends for her survival on the care she finds 
there.37 Helplessness, or Hilflöskigkeit, is Freud’s word; Jacques Lacan refers to the ‘specific prematurity of 
birth’ of the human infant; Jean Laplanche grounds his new foundations for psychoanalysis in the ‘primal 
situation’: ‘a new-born child, an infant in the etymological sense of the word (in-fans: speechless) is confronted 
with the adult world.’38 On the other hand, we find Winnicott arguing that psychoanalysis does not go far 
enough when it simply acknowledges that the environment is important; more strongly, on his view, it is 
impossible to separate the infant from the care provided for her by the world into which she is born.  
 
At the beginning of life, that world may well be the mother; that ‘the infant and the maternal care together form 
a unit’ is one of the starting-points of ‘The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship’ (though, as its title 
suggests, Winnicott is alert to the parental and paternal dimensions of that unit).39 Nonetheless the point 
remains to be driven home. ‘We are divided into two,’ he warns, ‘if there are some who do not allow that at the 
earliest stages the infant and the maternal care belong to each other and cannot be disentangled.’40 It is difficult 
not to hear a note of impatience, or perhaps weariness, in Winnicott’s brief history of psychoanalytic 
attachment to a set of ideas – in this instance, ‘personal defence organization’, ‘personal body scheme’, 
separateness of self – that presupposes in the infant levels of individuation and integration in dispute throughout 
‘The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship’.41 ‘At the level of the main part of this paper,’ Winnicott 
clarifies, ‘this state of affairs cannot yet be assumed. The discussion centres around the establishment of 
precisely this state of affairs, namely the structuring of the ego which makes anxiety from instinct tension or 
object loss possible.’42 It is to this point that Winnicott returns, once again, in his ‘Further Remarks’ to the IPA 
Congress in 1961 on the conditions of infantile life before the possibility of object relations: 
 
[I]f we look at an infant we see an infant in care. The processes of integration, and of separating out, of 
getting to live in the body and of relating to objects, these are all matters of maturation and 
achievement. Conversely, the state of not being separated, of not being integrated, of not being related 
to body functions, of not being related to objects, this state is very real; we must believe in these states 
that belong to immaturity. The problem is: How does the infant survive such conditions?43  
 
 
How does the infant survive such conditions? The question begins to take the measure of the demand on 
maternal care – the child’s ‘one-way, non-negotiable dependency’ as Lisa Baraitser characterises it – as well as 
providing the ground for Winnicott’s conviction that no-one is spared the ‘primitive agonies’ of infantile life: 
fears of ‘going to pieces’ and ‘falling for ever’, of ‘having no relation to the body’, of ‘having no orientation’, 
and of ‘there being no means of communication.’44 As Winnicott summarises the point in ‘Fear of Breakdown’ 
in 1963: ‘The ego cannot organize against environmental failure in so far as dependence is a living fact.’45 In 
other words, how far the baby survives those very real states of non-integration, non-relation, and isolation, 
depends on how far the environment – in Winnicott’s terms, the ‘environment mother’ – can protect him or her 
against too much exposure to the terrors of having been born. Defending against the pains of need (hunger, 
cold) as well as those perhaps less familiar dreads (falling apart, falling forever, falling empty), one of the 
functions of care on this model is to foster what Winnicott calls the baby’s ‘continuity of being’: uninterrupted 
being, along with the mother but not aware of her, is the basic aim of the mother-infant ‘set-up’, helping the 
infant to bear with what happens to him or her before the development of the ego that will support the capacity 
for individuated experiences (satisfaction, frustration, object relation, object loss).46  
 
‘This,’ as Adam Phillips summarizes, ‘was the conviction at the centre of Winnicott’s developmental theory. It 
was the rapport between the mother and her infant that made instinctual satisfaction possible; previous 
psychoanalytic theory had assumed it was the other way round.’47 The wager is extraordinary but, as Winnicott 
would insist, very ordinary too; or, as André Green suggests, Winnicott was noticing ‘what had been escaping 
everyone’s attention’: if all goes well, the labour of the environment-mother remains unseen, unnoticed, taken 
for granted (and not only by the baby).48 Nothing less than a reversal of reality takes place via this care in 
which the mother, identifying with her baby’s states of being, creates an environment in which he or she can 
experience absolute helplessness as a form of illusory omnipotence: what is needed is reliably ‘there’ via an 
other who is not yet recognized as separate from the baby, an other who offers ‘live, human holding’ 
(Winnicott’s phrasing) that is at once somatic and psychological (at this stage, the two cannot be 
distinguished).49  
 
Feeling her way into the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ things happening to her baby, the mother uses her mind and her body 
to recognise, and to reflect, the baby into being. She is, as Winnicott puts it in 1967, the first mirror, forming, 
and transforming, the baby’s earliest states, and thereby making them survivable, livable, meaningful. Again, it 
is easier to take the measure of that demand on (maternal) care in light of Winnicott’s description of the agonies 
attendant on its disruption, or failure: ‘Such interruptions constitute annihilation, and are evidently associated 
with pain of psychotic quality and intensity.’50 In ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’, he elaborates that idea of 
interruption through the everyday play of reflection between mother and baby: 
 
Now, at some point the baby takes a look round. … What does the baby see when he or she looks at the 
mother’s face? I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herself. In other words 
the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees there. All this is too 
easily taken for granted. I am asking that this which is naturally done well by mothers who are caring 
for their babies shall not be taken for granted. I can make my point by going straight over to the case of 
the baby whose mother reflects her own mood or, worse still, the rigidity of her own defences. In such a 
case what does the baby see?51  
 
All this, Winnicott tells us, ‘belongs to the beginning’, when what Bollas refers to as the ‘infant-mother culture’ 
is being established through the idiom – gesture, gaze, language – of environmental care.52 Read in the context 
of Winnicott’s analysis of the mother-infant unit, the ‘mirroring’ taking place here is a form of generative 
transformation, a way of returning the baby to herself that enables her to continue with the work of ‘going on 
being’; in other words, the mother’s face – its movement, its animation, its reflectiveness – is part of the 
holding so vital to early environmental provision.53 If the mother’s face is not a mirror, if she cannot lend 
herself to her baby when the baby ‘looks’ for her, then the possibility of a transformative exchange between the 
two of them – a ‘two-way process’ in Winnicott’s terms – is interrupted, or lost.54 Falling apart, falling alone, 
falling forever: what the baby loses is the mother’s mind, her (adult) capacity to imagine and elaborate what is 
being lived through.  
 
On occasion, this is an inevitable, even necessary, experience (the mother, Winnicott will say, must fail). More 
strongly, it is structural to Winnicott’s account of the mother as mirror: ‘the mother is looking at the baby and 
what she looks like is related to what she sees there.’55 That nuance is crucial. What the mother looks like is 
related to, but not identical with, what she sees when she looks at her baby. This is relation, not reproduction; it 
is relation forged in identification and reflection between two. Not everything is, or can be, caught up in the 
mother’s face, or the gift of her looking back. On the contrary. The not-seen, the not-reflected, shadows 
Winnicott’s understanding of the relation between mother and infant: be it the face of a ‘good enough’ mother 
(alive, reflecting but not all) or, at the other end of the spectrum, a face full of the mother’s mood, unreflecting, 
‘dead’. On this reading, not finding herself in the other – not being found, not being seen – is a fundamental 
aspect of the experience of coming into being (or, as Juliet Mitchell notes in a different context, ‘a primal 
nonrecognition … would be everybody’s human lot to some degree.’56  
 
On my understanding of Winnicott, it is the balance between being seen and not-seen, found and not found, that 
makes the difference between living and not-living. ‘We have yet to tackle the question of what life itself is 
about,’ he writes in ‘The Location of Cultural Experience’ in 1967. ‘Our psychotic patients force us to give 
attention to this sort of basic problem.’57 Returning to the vicissitudes of early infantile life – ‘Trauma,’ he 
explains, ‘implies that the baby has experienced a break in life’s continuity’ – Winnicott runs a line between the 
‘living fact’ of dependence and the possibility of creative living.58 The question of what life is about may well 
be a privileged example of what Arendt once described as the genre of the ‘unanswerable questions of 
meaning’.59 But supporting the idea of the human being as a producer of meanings, it runs like a red thread 
through Winnicott’s later writings. What makes life worth living? What makes life feel real? What makes life 
life? The questions belong to all of us, but it is the form of suffering that Winnicott identifies as psychotic – 
‘hovering between living and not living,’ as he puts it – that keeps the problem in view (that psychosis is an 
‘environmental deficiency disease’, the effect of a failure to make the dependence of early infancy bearable, is 
one of the implications of his claims).60 The capacity to experience life, to make it real and find it worth living, 
Winnicott concludes, can happen ‘only in relation to a feeling of confidence on the part of the baby, that is, a 
confidence related to the dependability of the mother-figure or environmental elements, confidence being the 
evidence of dependability that is becoming introjected.’61 Or, as Winnicott insists elsewhere: ‘No-one can hold 
a baby unless able to identify with the baby’ – a statement that puts empathy and imagination at the core of his 
thinking about the ‘real meaning of the word dependence.’62  
 
In other words, Winnicott’s excavation of dependence bring us up against the fact that the potential of being, or 
becoming, human depends on a psycho-somatic and psycho-social experience of care. The baby needs to be 
met by another human mind, and by a world in which the mother has a mind to meet her baby. The 
consequences of that insight have secured Winnicott’s unique place in post-war British social history; as Sally 
Alexander has pointed out, his ideas were ‘part of the ethical and practical thinking that informed the British 
welfare state’s provision of need through its clinics, hospitals, welfare centers, schools, and homes from the 
1930s to the 1950s.’63 On this reading, the idea of ‘holding’, or the holding environment, becomes a key term 
for extending the reach of Winnicott’s thinking beyond the mother’s arms and out into the world of family and 
society.64 Certainly, in retrospect, the caring function of the mother and the caring function of the state appear 
to converge: in the form of direct support for mothers and babies, certainly, but more broadly in terms of a post-
war structure of feeling that at once facilitates, and is facilitated by, Winnicott’s psychoanalysis of the mutual 
imbrication of dependence and mind, care and human creativity.  
 
 
‘I, Daniel Blake, Demand My Appeal Date Before I Starve’ 
  
‘Wouldn’t it be awful if the child looked into the mirror and saw nothing?’65  
 
When those who have power to name and to socially construct reality choose not 
to see you or hear you, whether you are dark-skinned, old, disabled, female, or 
speak with a different accent or dialect than theirs, when someone with the 
authority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is a 




‘I think I would be a very different person now,’ writes Carolyn Steedman in Landscape for a Good Woman in 
1986, ‘if orange juice and milk and dinners at school hadn’t told me, in a covert way, that I had a right to exist, 
was worth something. My inheritance from those years is the belief (maintained always with some difficulty) 
that I do have a right to the earth.’67 Growing up in south London in the 1950s, Steedman belongs to one of the 
first generations of children whose lives were shaped by the post-war vision of the British social state. ‘What 
my mother lacked, I was given’ is her succinct summary of the difference introduced by that vision – however 
flawed, or under-achieved, it may have been in the decades between 1945 and the election of Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative Government in 1979.68 As a feminist and a historian, Steedman is well aware of both 
the limits imposed by the entanglement of the social state in traditions of liberal philanthropy – that ingrained 
notion of post-war reconstruction, as Gareth Stedman-Jones puts it, as ‘for the welfare of, rather than by the 
agency, power and intelligence of, the working class’ – and its vulnerability to fading, or reversals, in political 
commitment from both Right and Left.69 But her concerns also lie elsewhere: ‘If it had been only philanthropy,’ 
she wonders, ‘would it have felt like it did?’70 
 
Orange juice, milk, school dinners: this is a child’s eye view of food security, one that supports Steedman’s 
analysis of what she describes as a ‘structure of care and affection’ embedded in the state’s provision for her 
child self.71 Crudely, dinners and juice tell Steedman that she matters and is wanted in the world. Propped on 
that provision is a young girl’s fragile sense of having a life worth nourishing – feeding, housing, educating – 
against the odds of personal beginnings riven by the effects of material and symbolic dispossession. Countering 
those beginnings, the welfare state intervenes to help Steedman believe in her right to exist, even to flourish; its 
provision of (material) care creates a potential space in which a life worth living can emerge and take shape. In 
this sense, what Steedman offers in Landscape for a Good Woman is a remarkable insight into the psycho-
social formations of human need; more strongly, in her attention to the lived experience of welfare relations, 
she appears to have documented an encounter with what Cooper and Lousada describe as a ‘social state of 
mind’ discoverable in a society’s ways of dealing with – managing, transforming, ameliorating, provoking, 
ignoring, exacerbating, exploiting – our collective and individual needs.72 In other words, the vicissitudes of the 
social state help to identify what Steedman describes as the relation between psychic structures and state 
interventions, the capacity of the state to tell its citizens that they have a right to exist – lives worth living and 
minds worth nourishing.73 Or not. 
 
From its opening sequence I, Daniel Blake cues its audience into what it means to encounter a social state that 
has abandoned its commitments to care. Faced with a black screen, what we hear is a tragi-comic rendition of a 
work capability assessment as Blake is forced to undergo the now notorious ‘fit for work’ test administered on 
behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions. We listen to a woman reading from a list of questions that, as 
Blake points out, he has already answered on the form he has already returned. What Blake needs is recognition 
of the fact that he is recovering from a heart attack, and money to live on until he is well enough to return to 
work. What the assessor is there to do is to take him through a scripted interview to produce a score that will 
determine Blake’s fate – a fate weighted on the side of a supposed reduction of state spending on welfare 
benefits.74  
  
In this context, Blake is not a patient but a claimant, exposed to a discourse that neither reflects, nor responds 
to, his experience of illness and the subsequent struggle to survive. That Blake does not immediately recognise 
that lack of fit, that he maintains his spontaneity in the face of an encounter drained of individual 
meaningfulness, is vital to the scene’s dark comedy. ‘I’m a health care professional’; ‘If we can just keep to 
these questions?’: the assessor’s appeals to status and script announce the redundancy of her professional 
responsibility. ‘If you ask questions you get answers – and hardly anything else’: reflecting on the uses of 
psychoanalysis to family doctors in 1957, Michael Balint evoked a world of general practice now difficult to 
imagine in its commitments to continuity of care – the family doctor in a position to know his patients as people 
– and the crucial importance of listening to what patients say.75 Writing less than a decade after the founding of 
the National Health Service in 1948, his words appeal to a world away from the ‘monumental farce’ (Blake’s 
phrase) now playing out on the cusp between the DWP and the NHS (or rather, in the space that emerges when 
the DWP displaces the NHS from decisions once grounded in clinical judgement).76 The ‘health care 
professional’ is not a doctor and the forms of knowledge available to understand what it means to recover from 
a heart attack appear to have no place in the assessment process. On the contrary. The role of the interviewer is 
not to listen, but to ensure that the claimant – who is not her patient – cannot speak freely; in the world of 
welfare documented by I, Daniel Blake, no-one wants that form of free speech, or a medical professional 
listening with empathy and concern.  
 
Farce can also be a form of terror. In this sequence, that terror may be held at bay by Daniel Blake’s play with 
words, and his exposure of the ‘brick wall’ of the bureaucratic function. That artful black screen, and the 
absence of a human face from the field of vision, capture something of the ‘blanking’ of human vulnerability by 
the modern welfare imagination – a blanking by no means confined to the formal mechanisms of welfare 
bureaucracy. Take, for example, Toby Young’s invective against the film, giving voice to the entire ‘climate of 
opinion’ (to borrow W.H. Auden’s phrase) in which I, Daniel Blake takes up its place. ‘I’m no expert on the 
welfare system,’ Young wrote in the Daily Mail in October 2016: 
 
but several aspects of I, Daniel Blake don’t ring true. The two protagonists are a far cry from the 
scroungers on Channel 4’s Benefits Street, who I accept aren’t representative of all welfare recipients. 
But Loach has erred in the opposite direction. For a filmmaker who styles himself a “social realist”, he 
has an absurdly romantic view of benefit claimants.77   
 
 
This is the new neoliberal common sense, and it is no wonder that imagination can fail in the face of its refusal 
to budge from what it wants to know of the world. Young is not interested in the evidence amassed by I, Daniel 
Blake (or, by extension, the many organisations and campaigns challenging the rhetorical environment in which 
benefit claimants are regularly denounced as ‘scroungers’ and ‘shirkers’, and government ministers can cast the 
continuing rise in the use of food banks as a phenomenon to be expected in austere times). ‘We heard far worse 
stories than the ones in the film,’ Loach tells Alissa Wilkinson in interview following the success of I, Daniel 
Blake at Cannes in 2016. ‘But we didn’t want to take the most extreme stories. We wanted to show that this 
could happen to anybody.’78 At stake is the transformation of what Loach calls ‘raw emotion’ into a cinematic 
object to be used – shown, shared, interpreted – by its diverse audiences. In this context, I, Daniel Blake – the 
title announces its potential as an occasion for testimony – has opened up a space for men, women and children 
living with, and sometimes dying from, the effects of an accelerating austerity experiment to speak into the 
public domain. ‘I, Daniel Blake, Demand My Appeal Date Before I Starve …’: to a welfare system peopled by 
‘Decision Makers’ and ‘Health Care Professionals’, issuing ‘Sanctions’ and ‘Formal Directives’, and ‘Digital 
by Default’, Blake writes back. Literally. On the wall of the job centre, that new circle of hell for so many. ‘My 
new art installation,’ Blake announces to the crowd gathering to applaud his graffiti, his last resort in the face of 
state mindlessness – and, now, a means to frame the testimony of claimants in their own acts of ‘writing back’: 
(Figure 1)  
 
Blake’s graffiti – image and text – has taken on a life of its own beyond the film79 
 
It is a measure of the distance we have travelled from the initial commitments of the post-war social state – the 
idea of the ‘full life’ and ‘social security for all’ (the one leaning on the other) – that I, Daniel Blake can be 
dismissed so easily as a form of socialist romanticism. On the other hand, the question of what, if anything, 
cinema can do to counter that dismissal haunts its critical reception. Loach’s oeuvre is renowned for its 
commitment to the stories of ‘ordinary people’, living on the margins of structures of power and investiture; in 
fact, the idea of the ordinary is one of his points of contact with Winnicott (and, indeed, with Stuart Hall). 
However, writing several years before the release of I, Daniel Blake, John Hill points to widespread concern 
that ‘Loach’s cinema was becoming almost completely devoid of any hope for social and political change. As 
Loach himself has observed, “[a]udiences are much less optimistic, much less prepared to engage in the 
possibility of change” and “you have to work harder to get that [change] in their minds”’.80  It is as if 
imagination – oppositional, counter-intuitive forms of imagination – are failing in the face of the difficulty of 
changing anything. Hopelessness, very real and very felt, is one prevalent response. 
 
Reading between Winnicott and Loach, it may be that the question of whether or not films like I, Daniel Blake 
can ‘change anything’ is beside the point.81 Or, rather, our understanding of what ‘change’ is, and how it can 
happen, may need to be re-thought. Elaborating on forms of lived experience marginalised, denied, and vilified 
in contemporary British culture and politics, I, Daniel Blake – and, by extension, Loach’s documentary 
aesthetic – can be understood as a form of reflecting, and giving back, what is there to be seen but is all too 
often ignored (and ignored in a motivated way). That form of reflection cannot be taken for granted, and part of 
the work of I, Daniel Blake has been to expose the effects of its absence. As such, the film provides a form of 
holding against the violence of non-recognition, its capacity to shape – or, rather, reduce – the forms of life 
available in 21st century Britain. Again, that holding cannot be taken for granted.  
 
Can a film ‘hold’ you? The question captures the challenge of the encounter between Winnicott’s 
psychoanalysis and the objects and practices of cultural interpretation. It is not only that Winnicott’s writings 
are especially attuned to the individual and collective harms imposed by a neoliberalism apparently wedded to 
the denial of human need and vulnerability. More broadly, his analysis of dependence – mind, care, creativity – 
opens on to a series of questions about the role of cultural objects in creating ‘holding environments’, both on 
and off screen. I, Daniel Blake brings such questions in to particular focus. Offering itself as an object to think 
with, and against, the neoliberal attack on the social state, it holds out the possibility of relating differently to 
the facts of human dependence and vulnerability; in this sense, Loach’s film takes on the labour of knowing and 
symbolising the reality of human need identified by Cooper and Lousada as one of the functions of the post-war 
social state.82 It is at once a force for social criticism (the more familiar idea of engaged cinema), and a form of 
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